A Neofunctionalist Perspective upon the Role of the U.S. in Spurring the Early Stages of European Integration

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Abstract
Our demarche shall consist of analyzing, from the neofunctionalist perspective, as developed in the works of Ernst B. Haas, the early stages of European integration, in order to identify the often-overlooked role the U.S. has played in the process, in the context of its anticommunist policies. Moreover, we shall highlight the cultural and doctrinaire elements of American inspiration that constituted themselves into the ideate basis of the process of European integration, which, eventually, got absorbed into the groundworks of the European establishment. However, while the concepts of spillover and enmeshment do constitute key elements of our demarche – and we have used them extensively for making our point – we have not confined ourselves indiscriminately to the neofunctionalist perspective, but, wherever necessary (though without exiting our paradigm of work), have tackled the issue from the standpoint of other explanatory theories of international relations, as well, in order to provide as comprehensive an image of the envisioned phenomena as possible.

Keywords: European integration, Ernst Haas, neofunctionalism, spillover, enmeshment, containment, support, values, U.S.A.

1. Preliminary considerations

As early as the 1970’s, with the elaboration of the democratic peace theory¹, it has become widely known that democracies have a tendency not

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to wage war onto each other, their societies tending to be characterized by an increased humaneness as compared to the state of mind dominating societies ruled by totalitarian regimes. Moreover, it is far more likely for democracies to forge lasting alliances between each other, or to engage in collective security mechanisms, than it is for totalitarianisms (the latter may, indeed, ally themselves with democratic regimes, but the resulting alliances tend either to regard only certain common enemies, or will break apart with comparatively greater ease).

This constitutes an excellent explanation for President Roosevelt’s decision to commit his country to serve as the great arsenal of democracy,\(^2\) providing the free world the materiel it needed to defeat the Nazi aggression. Moreover, maintaining the same perspective upon things would constitute an explanation for the breakup of the wartime alliance as soon as the common menace had vanished, and for the ensuing polarization of the world, the Cold War having as defining, characterizing trait the ideological struggle between democracy and communism.

If we analyze the issue from the ideology-devoid perspective of realism in international relations, we shall also arrive at a similar outcome, namely that it was in the United States’ interest to support the European nations against the rising danger from the easternmost part of the continent. Thus, whether dictated by the noble idea of preserving democracy, or only by the interest of containing communism, the U.S. had to involve itself in consolidating the Western European countries that had not yet succumbed to communist domination, in order to prevent them from sharing the fate of their less fortunate, Eastern neighbors.\(^3\)

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3. And, actually, the U.S. would prove quite successful in this endeavor: it has been rightfully argued that the expanding of the American sphere of influence in Western Europe was far more successful (and, actually, on a larger scale) than that of the Soviets in the Easternmost part of the continent, as whilst the latter had to rely only upon force to push boundaries, the former, by acting “more in accordance with the will of the local populations”, helping instead of extorting them, and thus creating a looser sphere of influence, this would actually prove the most durable one. Vid. Lundestad, Geir (1986), “Empire by Invitation? The United
One should not be surprised, then, that the U.S., the country that had born the economic brunt of securing victory in World War II would choose not to abandon the work it had started (as it had done after the first global conflagration), but to support the process of European integration, in pursuit of a threefold goal: preventing the resurgence of fascism or of philo-fascist elements, consolidating democracy and the rule of law (especially in states such as Greece and Italy, where the communists threatened to take over the reins of power) and spurring economic development, since prosperity and political stability tend to go hand-in-hand.

In this latter respect, the U.S. would not confine itself to provide economic aid, but would dedicate a large part of its efforts to promote a self-sustaining process, that would consolidate the westernmost part of the European continent by the ever-deeper integration of an increasingly broader variety of domains of life in the envisioned countries. This latter phenomenon has been extensively analyzed and fit within a theoretical framework by Ernst Bernard Haas, the German-born political science professor at Berkeley who became the father of neofunctionalism.


While the Marshall Plan (established in 1947 and operational from 1948 to 1952) did provide financial and material resources needed to lift Europe from the postwar rubble, its allocated $13 billion were far less than would actually have been needed for the reconstruction of the continent. However, the idea was to “restore confidence, restore hope, that this time America was not going to abandon Europe” and to convey a political signal, that democracies do help each other and it is only the ill-will of hostile regimes that prevents people from the emoluments of international aid. Vid. “Transcript of Seeing The Victory Through: Fiftieth Anniversary Of The Marshall Plan”, in USAID, [http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/trans.html], July 1st, 2002.

We unreservedly acquiesce to the assertion that the idea of European unification was the most effective way of “control[ing] the Germans, contain[ing] the Soviets and reviv[ing] the European economies”. Unification was literally seen as a means of redemption from the so counterproductive differences of the past, greater unity being capable of helping Europe to “arise, like Lazarus from the grave, with new life and vitality”. Cf. Hoogan, Michael J., The Marshall Plan. America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 135.

We shall, by looking through the neofunctionalist looking-glass, see how a specifically-targeted policy, namely containing the advance of communism – and, perhaps, expanding American leverage – had far broader consequences, by generating the “ever-broader” European integration.

2. Spillover and enmeshment revisited

The latter theory of international relations has at its core the spillover theory, which basically states that greater integration is possible by starting from very punctual issues: at first, all necessary demarches are undertaken in order to achieve the highest level of integration in a very narrow, determined sector of the economic life. Once completed, the following, broader one comes under scrutiny, efforts being directed towards achieving integration at this more extended level; the cycle is meant to repeat itself until virtually all domains are covered and full integration is, eventually, achieved.

It is beyond any doubt that the spillover theory provides a pertinent explanation of the economic dimension of European integration, highlighting the way highly-specialized institutions such as the E.C.S.C. were followed by the development of even more complex organisms, which integrated even broader domains of activity (starting from issues of virtually no interest for the general public, but of prime importance for the participating economies, and arriving to nowadays’ situation, of extended regulation benefiting intra-communitarian consumers and common standards which ensure the interoperability of a great variety of services and functions).

However, this phenomenon, identifiable from the early 1950’s onward, addresses mainly the economic and administrative dimensions of the integration process and offers little insight upon the late 1940’s, period

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8 Or, in other words, “once an initial commitment was made, [the] forward momentum of integration was inevitable”. Moravcsik, Andrew, ”The European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy”, in *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12:2 (April, 2005) Routledge, pp. 349-386. Let us note that it was a special number, dedicated to the issue of neofunctionalism.
in which the American efforts, targeted at consolidating a Western Europe devoid from communism, were mainly exercised. It is noteworthy that Ernst Haas’s work addresses this issue as well (in less evoked volumes than the previously-cited one, it is true), highlighting other key aspects beyond the economic ones that have contributed – actually, even before them – to the development of the European structures as we know them nowadays.

Thus, one should not overlook the fact that the American policymakers did not restrain themselves to fostering prosperity as the material framework for peace and stability in Europe, but they also brought their determining contribution in spurring the institutional development of the emerging international structures of the Old World, their initiators being enthused to emulate the American federal model and to promote a set of values and principles which transcend national identity, namely democracy and political pluralism, the respect of otherness and human rights.

While the aforementioned ideas do have European roots, their origins being traceable in the works of British, German and French philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment, it is nonetheless true that it was necessary for the U.S. to re-export them back to Old World after a long period in which the latter was shattered by nationalistic and ideological strife. In this respect, it is noteworthy that while during the late 18th and 19th centuries the U.S. was the cultural appendage of Europe, the 20th century would bring a radical overturn of this situation, for, ever since the U.S. came to support the European democracies, it is the Old World that has become, from many standpoints, a prolongation of American initiatives.¹⁰

Or, if we are to acquiesce to the more radical standpoint of Andrew Moravcsik, “Haas denies that regional integration, once it gets started, is either an enterprise conducted by European idealists for its own sake”, but is a process that will gain its own momentum, once set into motion, either it as a result of “Cold War geopolitics, or a pragmatic response to exogenous

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economic challenges”¹¹ (though none of these should take exclusive credit, in Mr. Moravcsik’s view).

Therefore, we may appreciate that postwar Europe has become, thanks to President Harry S Truman’s policies for remote defense,¹² the place of practical implementation for the ideals given utterance by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who both had championed their country’s stepping up on the international arena in the defense of freedom, justice and human rights,¹³ for reasons grounded in the doctrine of American exceptionalism.

In the short run, the American aid efforts were meant to foster economic growth so that the European nations would be able to rebuild their economies, thus escaping once and for all from the postwar poverty and return to a state of political normalcy similar to the one that has largely characterized the interwar years.¹⁴ Thus, the American statesmen duly hoped that the European nations would give up any totalitarian propensities – be they either leftist or right-wing – and that they would reaffirm their beliefs in the long-term viability of constitutional democracies (which may, indeed, suffer more acutely in times of depression than the strictly-controlled planned economies of

¹¹ Moravcsik, A., op. cit., p. 351.
¹² For, even though containment relied upon providing assistance to any freedom-loving nation that wanted to stand up against communism, it was not merely a means of defending their peoples from falling subject to totalitarianism, but constituted a second line of defense, situated overseas, for the U.S. mainland – where fears of a Soviet attack would remain at a significantly high level for decades.
¹³ Or, in the words of Henry Kissinger, “[envisioning] a world arena governed by international law and not by balance of powers, inspiring a sentiment of confidence in the nation and not national affirmation of one’s own value” – Kissinger, Henry, Diplomatia, București: Bic All, 2002, p. 38.
¹⁴ It is essential that a country benefits from both economic prosperity and political stability for it to remain committed to the values of democracy; even though, theoretically, the political system is functional and has all the appropriate institutions well settled, a dramatic deterioration of economic conditions may inflict a severe blow to political stability, as discontented citizens are far more easily manipulated by totalitarian factions, who will thus find an opportunity for acceding to power – for details, and an illustrative account of the way the Weimar Republic, which initially was democratic, would soon give way for the Nazi Reich, vid. Taylor, Alan John Percivale, The Origins of the Second World War, Paris: Penguin Books, 1963.
totalitarianisms, but are, nevertheless, the only ones capable of securing prosperity in the long run).

However, acting in the realm of material prosperity alone would not have constituted a sufficient undertaking; even though material achievements are, undeniably, the easiest to perceive, a nation’s stability is determined by a broader summmum of factors, including the solidity of its constitutional settlement and, probably even more importantly than the legal technicalities, the people’s confidence in that state’s institutions15 and in the fact that laws are not applied arbitrarily, either by a clique or, even worse, at the whim of a single despot.

Taking as a starting point the assumption according to which European security and unity are mutually intertwined, the U.S. had to offer the Old World its unconditional support, in order for the new establishment to be grounded upon common standards regarding human and civil rights and an evenly-spread cherishing of democracy and liberally-oriented values.

The American institutional model was by no means imposed in Europe, even the vanquished countries, Germany and Italy, being allowed to carve out political systems that suited their local specificities best, as long as they followed the American guidelines regarding the well functioning of a democratic society; moreover, the fact that, even during the Great Depression, the U.S. had been practically the only major country in which socialism did not gain any political relevance16 constituted irrefutable arguments that the American example was one that the European nations should follow, and this included not only opposing totalitarianism and trying to replicate domestically the American way of life at the micro level, but also – with the inherent reserves required by the specificities of a diverse continent – several beneficial traits of the initially confederal, then

15 A democracy’s viability is best proved when it can afford to allow the antidemocratic discourse of some factions within, in order not to restrict in any way the rights to free speech and to peaceful rallies, even those promoting hate speech. In this respect, the U.S. has proven by far the most viable democracy of the 20th century. For an illustrative account, vid. Liptak, Adam (June 11, 2008), “Hate speech or free speech? What much of West bans is protected in U.S.”, in The New York Times, NY Times Co.
federal model of the U.S. And, in the context of the harshest years of the Cold War, setting the ground stones of the “European common house” appeared as the soundest possible alternative, as it was capable not only of providing prosperity, but increased security and the prospects for unprecedented future development, as well.

Another important aspect for understanding European integration is Ernst Haas’s finding, namely that, in the conduct of their policies, states do not only “learn” by identifying the best possible responses to outer stimuli, but especially by adapting their core objectives to what policymakers deem as achievable under the given circumstances. Therefore, we may conclude, under the “adequate” circumstances, it may be possible for one or more states to act in utter contradiction to what had previously been universally been acknowledged as their core national interests.

Thus, taking into account their nations’ past experiences, governments may choose to synchronize their objectives with each other and act in pursuit of their national interests not on their own, but in a concerted manner, that presupposes more collaboration and less confrontation, even with former arch-enemies (but against whom, under the new circumstances, it would be totally pointless to wage war, as it would be more advantageous to collaborate with). If looking at the issue from this latter perspective, the postwar developments – the acceptance of countries that once prided themselves with their military might to place themselves under the American security umbrella, the Franco-German reconciliation and the setting in motion of the process of European integration, including the creation of common institutions and organisms – no longer appears as so surprising phenomena.

Given the fact that the Soviet armies were already deep into Central Europe at the end of the war, it would have been virtually impossible for the U.S. to prevent them from carving their so badly-craved sphere of influence, especially since this would have implied the risk of having to wage another war – against a former ally – so soon after the bitter years of World War II, situation neither the American public, nor its policymakers

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17 Haas, 1970, p. 11.
truly favored\textsuperscript{18}. Under these circumstances, containment appeared as the most viable option, as reinforcing the flanks of the “rimland” (to be using the term coined by Halford Mackinder\textsuperscript{19}) would be the most appropriate undertaking for forestalling the Soviet advance.

This would be done either by engaging in active combat against the insurgent communist forces, as in Korea and Indochina, or by rebuilding the local economies and spurring a rebirth of the previously war-torn countries (as in Western Europe and in Japan), so that, on one hand, they would emerge stronger and capable of defending themselves – with outer aid, and within the framework of a collective security settlement, of course – and, on the other, to win their peoples’ hearts and minds, so that peace-, freedom-loving and pro-American nations would be willing to hold their ground against any potential outer oppressor.\textsuperscript{20}

Following the same line of argumentation, and applying the classical theories of international relations, we realize that from the perspective of realism, aiding Western Europe was justifiable from a geopolitical calculation, namely of counterbalancing the Soviets from getting the upper hand in the Old World. However, things should not be regarded solely from this amoral perspective, but, for once, that – given the fact that the U.S. had emerged out of isolationism and involved itself internationally at the initiative of President F.D. Roosevelt and that Harry Truman was a digné continuator of his policies – we are under the incidence of the application of the doctrine of American exceptionalism, its proponents willing to stand up for the principles embodied by their nation and promote them abroad,\textsuperscript{21} not only for the advancement of the American


\textsuperscript{20} Let us remark that, while, apart for Britain, pro-Americanism is at its nadir nowadays, it is not due to an embrace of anti-liberal ideologies in Europe, but to a fear of hegemonism and over-extended patronage from behalf of their transatlantic counterpart. On the contrary, we may argue that, from certain standpoints, the Europeans have embraced the principles of respect for the otherness, engagement through peaceful dialogue and advancing their interests through economic means rather that at gunpoint even better than the Americans would prove during the latest decades.

interests, but for the betterment of the situation in the envisioned nations, as well.

And, moreover, unlike its contemporary, neoconservative version, where the pragmatic calculations have often been overlooked for the sake of promoting a certain policy, the exportation of values and principles was not directed to replace any conception preexisting in the targeted countries, but simply to foster the peaceful, democracy-prone ones and to quell those biased towards totalitarianism.

From this standpoint, we could – by borrowing a concept from the libertarian economists – deem the situation as a mutually-beneficial trade: on one hand, the U.S. gains by seeing its enemies contained and a potential danger kept under check, while its allies benefit from the increased stability brought to their regimes and from the possibility of continuing to live unoppressed.

Coming back to the issues of cultural nature, we can consider that, ultimately, the American policies of promoting their model and defending liberty found an interesting form of crowning in the process of European integration, which presupposes a way of conducting economic and political affairs between the member nations of confederate inspiration, roughly similar to the early stages of political development of the United States.

The success of these policies was ensured, according to Ernst Haas, by the fact that the U.S. did by no means act in an irrational or exaggerated manner, but, on the contrary, adapted their policies of transforming the envisioned countries to the conditions and realities characterizing the international arena those days\(^2\) (which, as a parenthesis, is something latter-day neoconservatives, adepts of an agenda of regime change which often overlooks both local specificities and the mood on the international arena, should have been aware of), thus optimal results being secured, both for the U.S. and for the nations of Western Europe.

Basically, a unified Europe (or, to be more specific, undergoing a rapid process of integration), where all states embraced democratic regimes, that observed the rights and liberties of their constituents would, on one hand, become increasingly capable of withstanding Soviet pressure and, on the other, would have developed its economy and become a reliable trading partner of the U.S. (Though, from this respect, it is

\(^{22}\) Griffiths, 2003, p. 297.
interesting to remark that the Americans have been rather too successful, as nowadays the E.U. has increasingly become to have a voice of its own, when matters of global importance are under scrutiny, its views often diverging from those promoted by their former benefactor).

Nevertheless, Western Europe and the U.S. have been and remain close partners of dialogue, this being in full accordance with the model devised by Ernst Haas, who viewed the “weaving of an [ever-denser] web of interdependencies” between the New and Old Worlds: the U.S. was going to commit itself to saving Europe from its postwar miseries, while the latter was going to embrace, on an ever-increasing scale, the American model (“domestic” – that is, intra-communitarian – policies included). A more proactive international implication of the U.S. constituted, according to Haas\textsuperscript{23}, the best instrument for the long-term curtailment of communism and, generally speaking, for the pursuit of America’s interests worldwide.

Moreover, for all these policies to succeed, a more integrative relationship between the powers on both shores of the Atlantic, taken to the level of mutual interdependencies, of the enmeshment between the undertakings of all parties involved to the degree of inseparability was needed, situation deemed as advantageous, at first, by the U.S. and its European partners, alike.

It is beyond any doubt that accentuated integration, sectorial at first and generalized later on, would have been highly profitable for the Western Europeans even without the political and collective security agreements their American counterparts were insisting so much upon, due to the material benefits the former would have nearly-automatically entailed. This, in turn, would – as, besides, the spillover theory would have predicted it – prove a further incentive for advancing on the path of integration.

It is noteworthy that, while the problem of diverging opinions between the E.U. (as it is known nowadays) and the U.S. has grown in intensity in the latest years, from certain respects it was identifiable also in the earlier stages of the integration process and that it has even spurred further the process of European integration. Basically, as we know ever

\textsuperscript{23} Haas, 1970, p. 10.
since Georg Simmel\textsuperscript{24}, conflicts are those which weld groups together: the European nations, though willing to cooperate and accept the aid of their American counterparts, would grow increasingly wary of the latter’s unilateral approach to diplomatic relations and to being always in the second echelon (with the U.S. retaining, inherently, the decisional upper hand).

The proactive role played by the U.S. in global – and, especially, European – affairs would be increasingly perceived as “the universalistic embrace of the U.S.A.”\textsuperscript{25} to which a functional counterweight had to be thrown into balance. From this perspective, it is not only the Soviet military threat that has catalyzed the process of European integration; the more diffuse “menace” of American takeover of all decisions concerning their “foreign”\textsuperscript{26} policies and, thus, the risk of becoming nothing more than an oversized protectorate, a “decisional appendage” of their transatlantic partners.

In order not to lose sight of the historical dimension of things, let us mention that the latter tendency would increasingly become manifest solely after an attenuation of the imminence of the Soviet military threat and only after a significant consolidation of the European decisional and institutional apparatus, phenomenon identifiable especially since the 1960’s (which in turn would lead to a further deepening of European integration).

By applying sociological methods, we realize that the previously-described phenomenon is largely similar to that of rallying against a military threat, with the major difference being that the cleavage lines will be drawn exclusively according to principle-related and ideological issues – which, undoubtedly, leads to a far stronger bond than it might have emerged solely from the need to face a common enemy. Therefore, we appreciate that the U.S. has brought a double contribution to the process of


\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., pp. 45 sqq.

\textsuperscript{26}I.e. overseas policies, as the European Communities were – if we are to remember Henry Kissinger famous butade – far from having a single voice and integration was – and still is – far from completed; we use the term operating with what would still be a juridical fiction, namely dealing with unified Europe as a single entity, with an unitary voice on the global arena.
European integration: at first, by providing the necessary aid for the European nations to reestablish their self-confidence and, afterwards, by stimulating the consolidation of a distinct European identity, by revealing the Europeans their specificities by contrast to their transatlantic counterparts.

However, even under these circumstances, it would be erroneous to infer that the U.S. would detach itself from European affairs; on the contrary, whenever the U.S. has a certain interest in an issue, as history would prove it in countless occasions, it would try to defend it by any means necessary, including – in the case of dealing with other democracies – the establishment of bilateral contacts and the conclusion of agreements, or recurring to the creation of a more elaborate institutional framework, meant to tackle with more intricate issues on a longer time span.

It is noteworthy that at the “domestic”, intra-communitarian level, most issues are solved within the developed institutional framework, but in the case of Euro-Atlantic relations as well, except for certain punctual – and, often delicate – issues in which the U.S. government had preferred to deal directly with the European nations, there are periodical E.U.-U.S. summits and many aspects are deferred to the appropriate international institutions and are thus solved by means of dialogue and collaboration.

This approach, based on the previously-evoked concept of enmeshment, presupposes that the U.S. will either involve itself in supporting the existing institutional mechanisms, or will try to create an adequate framework for international cooperation, by fostering the “political development” of their (would-be) partners, in order for them to adopt, if not a similar position, at least one that is reconcilable with the one endorsed by the U.S. Among the elements promoted as part of “political development” (which, nevertheless, are somehow reminding of the present day’s transformational diplomacy) one can identify adopting an anti-communist stance, several elements of pro-Americanism and peaceful development. Moreover, it is nearly obvious that the idea backed by American policymakers is that the more similarities they will have with their partners (and the latter between each other) and the more contacts and interactions they all will establish, the better sieved the web of

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27 Haas, 1970, p. 79.
interdependencies will be and, thus, the stronger and better functional it will become.

3. Concluding remarks

The aforementioned arguments are more than sufficient for supporting the implication of the U.S. in the process of reconstructing and reconverting of Europe from a never-ending battleground to (the incipient form) of a more perfect union (to be paraphrasing the U.S. Constitution); we should, once more, highlight the starting points and the outcomes of the U.S.-backed integration process: the once-and-for-all forgoing of the amoral system of balance of powers on the European continent, in favor of an international system based upon mutual cooperation, free trade, sectorial integration and the rule of law, which constitute undertakings favorable to the European nations and the U.S., alike.

While a peaceful environment and a common market\textsuperscript{28} was undoubtedly profitable for the Europeans, the U.S. would also benefit indirectly, for a peaceful climate, of increased stability, would, on one hand, reduce the need for the U.S. to involve itself in overseas endeavors for pacifying potential aggressors, all at the same time favoring the economic activities of what George Washington had once dubbed as “the republic of trade”.

We may argue that win-win approach (in which the Americans, by supporting the European integration, have to gain as they need to allocate less resources for the struggle against communism, while their trans-Atlantic counterparts gain as reconstruction and development is far easier in a politically-consolidated environment) is stemming from the fact that, contrary to what leftists may claim,\textsuperscript{29} acting in pursuit of one’s national

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{28}One should also bear in mind that there are interpretations according to which the neofunctionalist principles are applicable to the creation of the monetary union, as well. Vid. Jensen, Caster Stroby, “Neofunctionalist approach or German hegemony in creating the EMU”, in Cini, Michelle, European Union Politics, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 71-86.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{29}We have in mind authors like Howard Zinn (Zinn, Howard, The Zinn Reader. Writings on Disobedience and Democracy, New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997), or Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, Noam, Hegemonie sau supraviețuire. America în căutarea dominației globale, Filipeștii de Târg: Antel, 2003), whose works fervently criticize the American overseas involvement, as both imperialistic and nearly-colonial and as detrimental to those envisioned by the}
interests is not necessarily incompatible with the promotion of values and ideals, as the two can be perfectly complimentary. Moreover, from the same perspective, if minimizing the risks one faces is best achieved by helping others, providing aid constitutes the best undertaking possible. And this is the very thing the U.S. has achieved by spurring the process of European integration.

In order to conclude our brief introspection upon the American perspective regarding the onset of European integration, without overextending ourselves, let us synthesize our demarche by the following assertion: it is true that the process of European unification has started as a consequence of the American involvement, done mainly in pursuit of the United States’ interests on the world arena in the context of the Cold War, but, without the aforementioned involvement, it is highly likely that many of the positive aspects of the integration process would have never happened. Consequently, as Ernst Haas has argued throughout his work, the American involvement as catalyzing factor of European integration has been, indeed, one of the overwhelmingly positive contributions of the U.S. in global politics.

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2. Griffiths, Martin (2003), Relații internaționale. Școli, curente, gânditori, București: Editura Ziua.

interventionist policies. This definitely was not the case with spurring European integration, but it was obviously the opposite, as all parties involved had to gain.


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